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Recent Decisions
ANTITRUST - PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS -
STANDING
Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d
679 (8th Cir. 1966); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d
480 (9th Cir. 1967).
In any particular case arising under the antitrust laws of the
United States' broad questions of policy are certain to be somewhat
determinative. This is especially true with respect to standing of
private antitrust litigants. Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes
suits by "[alny person... injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' Treble damages
are to be awarded to a successful plaintiff.3  Although private suits
have been praised as an effective means of antitrust law enforce-
ment,4 the courts have generally been conservative and restrictive
in their interpretations of section 4.5 In the standing area, how-
ever, several recent decisions8 have made significant inroads upon
this traditional approach. Two of these cases, Sanitary Milk Pro-
ducers, Inc. v. Bergjans' and Hoopes v. Union Oil Co.,8 will be dis-
cussed herein against a background of case law and appropriate pol-
icy considerations.?
Soon after the enactment of the Clayton Act the courts evi-
1 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §5 1-7 (1964); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 55
12-27 (1964).
215 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
3Id.
4 Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, in 1 ANTITrUST
LAw AND TECHNIQUES 373 (M. Hoffman & A. Winard eds. 1963).
5 See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
6 E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966), rev'g 241 F. Supp. 259 (E.D.S.C. 1965);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1956).
7 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cit. 1966).
8 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cit. 1967).
9 For a discussion of the general subject of standing see generally E. KINTNER, AN
ANTITRUST PRIMER (1964); 1 L. ScHwARTz, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION 8-10 (3d ed. 1966); Loevinger, supra note 4; Pollock, Standing To
Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32 ABA ANTrTRUST L.J. (for-
merly ANTITRUST SECTION) 5 (1966); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements
and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 231 (1961); Note, Standing To Sue for Treble Damages Under Section
4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
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denced their conservative approach to standing,"° and demanded
that a plaintiff must not only show a pecuniary injury resulting from
a violation, but also a causal connection between the violation and
the injury.' Standing was frequently denied on the basis that the
injury was "indirect, incidental, consequential, remote, or collateral
... or [lacked] . .. 'proximate cause.' "" In short, the courts, be-
lieving that section 4 if extended through liberal interpretations
would have no limits - the "ripple" concept - decided that some
line must be drawn."
Thus, an early case refused standing to a shareholder-creditor of
a corporation which was bankrupt as a result of antitrust viola-
tions. 4 Two alternative rationales were employed: first, that the
Congress could not have intended to create such a multitude of po-
tential suits when a single suit by the corporation would rectify all
wrongs (at least to the shareholders), and second, that the injury
flowed to the corporation, not its shareholders and creditors.'" Al-
though it would seem appropriate to call the first rationale the
"derivative" theory, this term has actually been applied to the lat-
ter,'" the reasoning being that only those persons intended to be in-
jured by the defendant-violator are directly injured, while losses in-
curred by other parties which result from an impairment of a busi-
ness arrangement with the directly injured party are only indirect
or "derivative.""'
Two series of cases to which the above reasoning has been ap-
plied are relevant to Hoopes and Bergians respectively - those in-
volving lessor-injured lessees and those involving supplier-injured
distributors.
Two cases from the Third Circuit have held that nonoperating
lessors of movie theatres who have rental agreements with their
lessees based on a percentage of gross receipts do not have standing
against parties who have conspired to damage the theatres' busi-
ness'" even when the lessee was alleged to be a coconspirator.1'
10See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
"1 See Pollock, The "Iniury" and "Causation" Elements of a Private Antitrust Ac-
tion, 21 ABA ANlT'RusT SEcrIoN 341 (1962). See generally authorities cited note 9
supra.
12 Pollock, supra note 9, at 9.
13 See id. at 17-18.
14 Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
15 Id. at 709.
'o See Pollock, supra note 9, at 12-14.
17 See id. at 13.
18Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956); Harrison v.
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The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have reached a contrary result.2"
The Second Circuit has denied standing in an analogous situation
to a patentee whose exclusive licensee suffered the direct injury.2
The split in the circuits is dear. The reason for the split may be
that, although most courts will today apply the so-called "target
area 'u test rather than the "derivative" test, they differ in their in-
terpretation and application of it.23
The lessor-lessee cases have been cited as authority in the sup-
plier-distributor cases" presumably because of the economic similar-
ity between the two situations. The leading case denying standing
was a district court product.25 The plaintiff-supplier furnished 97
percent of its production to the directly injured distributor for use
as ingredients in soft drinks; one person owned 50 percent of the
supplier and 100 percent of the distributor through stock holdings.
The court, in spite of the common ownership, denied standing for
three reasons: (1) to allow the suit would provide a "windfall" for
the plaintiff; (2) Congress, by failing to amend section 4, has sanc-
tioned the narrow construction approach of the early cases; and
(3) one of the Third Circuit lessor-lessee cases.26 The Sixth Cir-
cuit has recently followed this decision in a case where common
ownership was not involved.'
The Ninth Circuit, liberal in the lessor-lessee area, seems liberal
in this area also as is evidenced by Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa.), afJ'd per curium, 211 F.2d 405
(3d Cir. 1953).
10 In the former case one judge dissented from denying a petition for rehearing on
the belief that this allegation deserved fuller consideration. Melrose Realty Co. v.
loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518, 519 (3d Cir. 1956).
20 Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957); Steiner v.
20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
21 Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
2 2 This test demands only that a plaintiff show himself to be within the "area of the
economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
2 The test is not perfect and is frequently confused with or related to others. See
notes 34 & 47 infra and accompanying text.
2 For example, Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956)
was relied upon in Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907,
909 (D. Mass. 1956).
25 Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass.
1956).
26 Id. at 909.
27 Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
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Corp 8 " Karseal has been distinguished by the restrictive courts on
the ground that there the plaintiff supplied the finished product
(petroleum items) rather than ingredients to its distributors. Such
a distinction proceeds on the premise that in Karseal the plaintiff
was more "aimed at" by the antitrust violator than were the plain-
tiffs in the ingredient cases.2"
It may be asserted that this distinction is economically unreal
and further confuses the issue by announcing another legal standard
that must be applied by the courts - finished products and raw
ingredients are but end points in a continuum of possible supplied
items - where is the line to be drawn? The "target area" test
under this reasoning becomes as fuzzy as the old "derivative, remote,
proximate" one.
An example of the confusion in this area is a recent Fourth Cir-
cuit determination." There the plaintiff, a council of dairy produ-
cers, sued defendant grocery stores and others, alleging an illegal
restraint in the marketing of milk products affecting its distributors.
The district court dismissed, distinguishing Karseal on the ground
that there plaintiff and defendant had been competitors,"' and thus
chose to follow the restrictive cases. The appellate court reversed
and granted standing." The court noted that section 4 speaks of
t"any person" rather than any "competitor." Karseal was followed
and the restrictive cases were distinguished on the grounds that milk
was a "finished product" and that no problem of dual ownership
was present.3" The court refused to read the restrictive cases beyond
their facts. It is felt that although this decision is sound, the court
was obviously confused by the conflicting passages in prior opinions
and thoroughly mixed the new "target area" test with the old "prox-
imate cause, remoteness" concepts.34
The two most recent judicial statements in the standing area -
Hoopes and Bergians - add needed, well-reasoned thought to the
problems heretofore discussed. Hoopes held that a nonoperating
owner of a gasoline station had standing on his allegations that the
28221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
29 See Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
3 0 South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966), fev'g 241 F. Supp. 259 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
31241 F. Supp. at 263-64.
32 360 F.2d at 420.
33 Id. at 418.
3 4 For a critical analysis see Pollock, supra note 9, at 19 n.63.
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defendant, as part of a scheme to monopolize, had coerced and
frightened away possible lessees by notifying them that it had a valid
requirements contract with the owner, Hoopes, when in fact the
contract had been adjudged to be an unenforceable lease-leaseback
agreement between Hoopes, Union, and previous lessees.35 What
is most significant about the case is not its holding (which may
even be reached by applying the rationale of the restrictive cases,
since the injury was direct in that it flowed from plaintiff's relations
with Union and was not derivitive through third parties) 36 but
rather the dictum intentionally used by the Ninth Circuit. In speak-
ing of the restrictive cases the court said "language in a number of
Supreme Court opinions casts doubts upon these and other restric-
tive 'judicial glosses' upon the broad language of" section 4.37 The
continuing validity of the Third Circuit decisions discussed previous-
ly3" was thus questioned. In returning to the language of section 4,
and in following the trend marked out by recent Supreme Court de-
cisions,39 the Ninth Circuit has made a valuable contribution to the
law.
Bergjans, on the other hand, is important for its holding. The
Eighth Circuit held that a milk producer which sold all its milk to
its wholly owned distributor which was in competition with de-
fendants and allegedly injured by their anticompetitive activities had
standing.4" Because here both dual ownership and the "finished
product" were parts of the factual pattern, the court was relatively
free to adopt whichever set of case law as precedent that it desired.
It will be remembered, however, that the recent Fourth Circuit de-
cision, on similar facts, distinguished the restrictive cases on the
ground that they involved dual ownership.4 The Eighth Circuit
court ignored this problem and responded to plaintiffs argument
that the Fourth Circuit finished product rule should control.'
35 374 F.2d at 485-86.
361d.
37 Id. at 485. The Supreme Court decisions mentioned were Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) and Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957). See also Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698-700 (1962).
38 Cases cited notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
39 See cases cited note 37 supra.
40 368 F.2d at 688-89.
41 Text accompanying note 33 supra.
42 It is interesting to note that the plaintiff also attempted to distinguish the restric-
tive dual ownership cases by arguing that the "windfall" rationale should not apply
since only the supplier, and not the distributor, was suing. Brief for Respondents at 61,
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As has been pointed out, however, this distinction is unreal;4"
the real explanation of the Bergians decision is that the court, hav-
ing before it all the cases previously discussed as well as the recent
Supreme Court implications,44 realized that the choice of whether or
not to follow the restrictive line of cases was squarely before it and,
instead of refusing to follow them, utilized the time-honored judicial
prerogative of distinguishing them on a weak factual basis. Thus,
while the court stated its decision to be directly within the holdings
of two liberal cases,45 its holding actually is a dear rejection of the
restrictive view.
The problems - and the confusion - in the standing area
seem to have arisen from unthinking judicial extensions of the early
case which denied standing to a shareholder-creditor. 6 While this
decision makes eminently good sense as applied to shareholders
(who have their remedy available in a suit by the corporation), it
is manifestly incorrect to apply it to cases involving lessors or sup-
pliers whose actual pecuniary damage will be totally uncompensated
if standing is refused.
The use of "incidental" or "lack of proximate cause" only serves
to muddy the waters; if standing is to be denied to parties such as
lessors or suppliers the result should be justified by an intelligent
interpretation of section 4 in light of the policies of the antitrust
laws, and not by blind usage of analogy to traditional tort law
where the use of "proximate cause" as a limitation is the result of
well-reasoned analyses of the policies of tort law. 7
Section 4, although it does provide for treble damages, has its
primary value as a preventive, not a curative, statute,4" and it seems
only logical that this is what its framers intended.49 The antitrust
laws, confused and contradictory as they are, are nevertheless an at-
Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
The court, however, did not even mention this ground, much less place reliance on it.
43 Text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
4 4 See cases cited note 37 supra.
45 368 F.2d at 689.
40 See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
47 Even respected authorities in the field use this analogy without expressing any
cogent reasons therefor. See Pollock, supra note 9, at 9 & n.15, 11 & n.29; Timberlake,
supra note 9, at 235.
48 Cf. 1 L SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 8 where the author states "private enforce-
ment.. . is significant not only because of the opportunity to recoup losses ... but
equally because potential liability.., is one of the most important incentives to 'volun-
tary' compliance with the law." See generally Loevinger, supra note 4.
4 9 The legislative history of section 4 is of little help in determining the scope Con-
gress intended the provision to have. Pollock, supra note 9, at 8-9.
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tempt to legislate an economic theory; to effectuate this theory it is
necessary that the laws be stringently enforced - and private action
can be the most effective way.5"
The broadened application of the "target area" test by the re-
cent cases is a commendable attempt to cut through the maze of
oratory and reach the basic question - what rule is demanded by
the policy of the antitrust laws? Bergjans and Hoopes are the two
latest examples of courts taking a more analytical approach to the
problem and arriving at more satisfactory conclusions.
It is to be hoped that eventually the only requirement for stand-
ing under section 4 will be, as the Supreme Court has indicated,5'
an allegation that the defendant's violation caused pecuniary damage
to the plaintiff. The only legitimate restriction in this writer's view
is one that is economically real - that is when some other remedy
is available as in the shareholder situation. Surely the evidentiary
obstacles that a private plaintiff must overcome,52 in addition to the
practical economics of such a suit,53 are sufficient protection to de-
fendants. It is only by removing or modifying the old restrictions
on standing that the policy of the antitrust laws can truly be effectu-
ated.
MICHAEL S. YAUCH
50 See Loevinger, supra note 4.
5 1 See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), where the Court
indicated that all that is required is that the plaintiff's injury be caused by the violation.
Id. at 453. Note that no adjectives such as "proximate" were employed.
52 For example, there exist the problems of proof of the violation, which are ob-
vious, and of proof of specific pecuniary damage, a factor which is explored in Rowley,
Proof of Damages in Antitrust Cases, 32 ABA ANTITRusT L.J. 75 (1966).
53 See Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ABA ANTITRUsT UJ.
87 (1966).
